"When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it." Frederic Bastiat 1801-1850 political economist __________________________________The velvet glove is off the golden fist. _________________________________________________________________________________________ PLUNDERFEST: Def: What the people of the United States can now look forward to.
Tuesday, December 1, 2015
Our Financial Sector has Become a Parasite
This post is (mostly) a copy of a comment (@131) in response to reason (@123 & @ 124) over at Crooked Timber: http://crookedtimber.org/2015/11/29/secular-stagnation-and-the-financial-sector/comment-page-3/#comment-650750
This is John Quiggin, the original poster, quoting himself in a previous post:
The financialization of the global economy has produced a hugely costly financial sector, extracting returns that must, in the end, be taken out of the returns to investment of all kinds. The costs were hidden during the pre-crisis bubble era, but are now evident to everyone, including potential investors. So, even massively expansionary monetary policy doesn’t produce much in the way of new private investment.
“Hugely costly financial sector” does not really describe what is going on: Massive tumor sucking the life out of its host is a much better description. The financial sector no longer serves society. It serves itself. Indeed, is 'Serve Oneself." not the motto of Capitalism? While the financial sector, (and we are talking about the activities of the large, and very large, and the wealthy, and very wealthy,) does occasionally allocate resources in the rest of the economy, to the rest of the economy, mostly it plunders the resources of society and allocates those resources to itself, for its own engorgement.
My comment:
You have disinflation in the real economy, but inflation in the fictitious (financial) economy. They have become separate economies. Money is being taken out of the real economy and pumped into the financial economy. Not only does this drive up the price of financial assets, (like money, BTW. but other assets which do not have a real value in themselves, but only value depending on the health of the real economy. Most tech toys and their industries, for instance. ) but financial assets chasing each other also drive up the price of financial assets.
Imagine a continuum of reality, starting at the left and going to the right, most real on the left, and decreasingly real and increasingly imaginary as you go to the right : Food and energy, on the left end, mining, then manufacturing, transport, etc, retail, hospitality, etc. in some order, high tech in there somewhere, then money in its various forms, bonds, stocks, etc. derivatives, other phantasmagorical financial instruments. It is an enormous bubble of ‘value’ where each item to the right is dependent for its survival on the health of the parts of the economy to its left. If, for instance, the food and energy sectors collapse, none of the rest of it will have any value.
The economy on the right is easy to capitalize and leverage and extract (financial) profits. So all investments are allocated over there. ( Capitalism invests in what is profitable, and only incidentally in what is needed.) The economy on the left, however, is leverage poor, and profit poor, so it is instead being allowed to deteriorate, and even where possible, plundered for its capital.
It is the size of this bubble which is maintaining the value of the dollar. And as the bubble increases relative to the size of the money supply, the value of the dollar also increases. (There is also a deflationary effect due to the trade deficit, since money is continually being taken out of the real economy, and put into the fictitious economy when, say, the Chinese deposit their money in US banks.)
It is all, of course, a manifestation of debt. Were the debt of the real economy honestly accounted for, it would be clear to everyone that there was no possibility that the people who actually produce the things we need could ever paying those f**king bloodsucking leeches even a fraction of what our f**king masters of the universe have defrauded the people of the world out of.
Indeed, our masters own our world, and our country several times over.
It just comes down to the day they decide to collect what is owed them.
Labels:
debt,
debt spiral,
economy,
financial sector,
production,
world
Progress and Pseudoprogress
What changes to what elements of society would qualify as
evidence of ‘progress?’ We sort of
assume society is making ‘progress,’ but we seldom check to see what is
actually happening, or ask if what is happening is really motion toward a
desirable, and necessarily sustainable, goal.
So let’s look at some trends, and decide whether they are indicative of
‘progress.’
Let’s start with some of the good ones.
For instance: Is
increasing inequality a sign of ‘progress?’
One could argue that it is a (necessary) price for progress, one that
fortunately doesn’t have to be paid by the wealthier beneficiaries of
progress. But do those who do have to
pay this price benefit from ‘progress’ at all?
Or is other people’s progress bought with their decline?
The environment is mostly more polluted.
More people, greater stress on limited resources.
More forests cut down.
Fewer wild animals.
More fisheries depleted or facing depletion.
Soil depletion.
Increased depletion of ground water.
Warmer more acidic oceans.
(US). Fewer
factories More office space
Fuel efficiency
But use more energy
Increasing reliance on distant sources of oil minerals which
must be extracted at increasing cost.
including mineral fertilizers.
Increased incarceration.
Increased polarization of society
Increased concentration of ownership of the means of production
Increased
concentration of ownership of media.
Increased concentration of ownership of whisky production
And:
Increased debt burdens of government and non-wealthy
More people:
More land planted
Increased spending on military.
Increased threats from terrorism
Lots more ‘data’
More money
(US)More guns in private hands.
(US) Increased costs of health services
(US) Increased costs of higher education.
(US) Increased trade deficit
(click on the little ‘MAX’ button)
Reduced spending on infrastructure.
More and more expensive technology for non-poor especially the very rich
The Internet.
(US ) Bigger houses. More mega mansions.
(US) More homeless. Increased poverty.
More useless anti-biotics
The rise of neo-liberalism
(US) More militarized police force
More corrupt politics
Serving narrow constituency, vs, the people.
Increased concern with the self. Vs public.
Increasing privatization of the commons.
More mega yachts
I'll get around to filling in most of the other references. (Or you could.) And perhaps some other indicators. (Or you could.) I apologize that some data are merely indicative. But I wanted to get the next post out.
Thank you.
Sunday, November 15, 2015
When, and Why, did the Economy Start to go Downhill
When, and Why, did the Economy Start to go Downhill
This post is in response to a question to a comment I made
over at:
It is also posted as a series of comments at that site.
rosserjb@jmu.edu asked the question:
“So, greg, please, exactly when out of all that mess was
"the turning point"?” referring to the point at which I said “when the
increasing energy cost of energy and other resource production started to be a
significant problem.” The word “mess” refers
to the entire price history of oil production.
So: The short answer
might be that point when it became (nominally) more profitable to exploit
society, to plunder it, rather than provision it and invest in it. When it became more profitable to be a pirate,
than a builder. (Understanding this
clarifies the motives and actions of the Right, and the modern capitalist.
“Greed is good” is the motto of a pirate, not a builder.) But
this transition itself is a consequence of the increased difficulty in
extracting resources from the environment.
In particular, non-renewable energy resources.
So if you want a date, sometime around the Reagan
presidency, in perverse reaction to the oil crises of the1970’s.
Roughly:
In the beginning, (Well, once the ball got rolling, about
1880.) http://cdn3.chartsbin.com/chartimages/l_oau_dff4ad5a049ca559d9105471f82bf873
the real cost of energy extraction was low, lower than the
cost of developing the infrastructure
needed to distribute and consume the oil.
So the cost of extraction was the benchmark for the price. Only as the
infrastructure for demand was emplaced did demand on occasion drive the
price. In the first half of the 20th
Century, because of the- inconsistent nature of the supply and its irregular
rate of increase, sometimes demand, sometimes supply drove the price.
With the opening of the Middle Eastern fields, supply
smoothed out. Supply and demand both
expanded apace, the price relatively stable and low. Until
the Arab oil embargo of 1973, and the later panic in 1979 due to the Iranian
crisis. The result was an effective and dramatic increase in the *real* cost of
oil to the US, since it now had to hand over an increased quantity of goods and services to pay to import foreign production. Domestic fields were becoming exhausted. New ones (Prudhoe Bay, etc.) more expensive to develop.
In an energy based society such as ours, (almost) all inputs
can be traced back to the energy needed to support them. Thus the size of the economy
can be measured in terms of energy consumption, and this is measured in terms
of energy input. This instead of dollars. With this understanding, the inverse of the
EROI, the energy return on (energy) investment, is the portion of the real economy
which must be devoted to the extraction of energy. Only the remainder of the economy is available
not only to providing services to society, but also to investment and
maintenance.
For EROI, see: "Energy, EROI and quality of life"
Check out: Fig. 1 The
Net Energy Cliff
Now: From about 2004,
supply has been constant, but until the 2008 crisis, demand increased, driving
up the price. Demand and price then
crashed with the recession, increased with the recovery, and recently spiked
again, and is now again depressed.
The question is why is the price, and demand, now
(relatively) depressed.
We return to the short answer, considering the gradually
decreasing EROI, that is, a gradually increasing average real cost of
extraction.
So: We have two
different measures of accounting in an economy:
Energy accounting, and money. Is
the price in money necessarily a faithful measure of the real cost, in energy,
of energy production?
Why should it be?
Instances where monetary price does not reflect cost, real or even
merely monetary, are common occurrences.
Is the current energy market one of them? In particular, we ask: “How can we subsidize energy
production?
Well, we can’t. When
we subsidize something, we divert real resources from elsewhere in the economy
to promote the production of the subsidized good.
We decrease the nominal cost, and therefore the nominal price at which
the good may be offered for profit.
However, the real cost must be greater than if the good were produced
without the subsidy. So when we subsidize the real cost of energy, we are
merely increasing the real cost of production. (Note: Subsidizing production is not to be confused
with subsidizing the capitalization of production.) That
is, because of the cost of our churning resources through the mechanism of subsidy, we are worse off than if we let the price reflect the real cost of
production.
However, we can still manage to increase quantity produced,
and depress price. Especially if we also depress demand. Remember, those resources transferred to
subsidize production can only come from one place: The remainder of the economy, where a portion
of those resources would have gone to maintain and capitalize the
infrastructure which supports the economy, the infrastructure which also
enables the consumption of oil.
How much is the subsidy?
Well, according to: http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/11/12/3721677/g20-fossil-fuel-subsidies/
the world formally spends about $400 billion per year, one way or
another subsidizing fossil fuel production.
(The US,
formally, a mere $25 billion.) Given an
inelastic demand curve, this can result in a dramatic reduction in price.
But there are other mechanisms of subsidy. For instance, consider the US trade deficit in goods. All those goods, if made in the USA,
would require energy inputs, and concomitant infrastructure, for their
production. Just as agricultural imports
can be regarded as water imports, the importation of goods can be regarded as
energy imports. So energy supply is increased, while demand is
contracted.
Further, the production cost of fracking, while recently improved,
is still above the current market price of oil. (Externalization of costs also
represents a form of subsidy.) This
production has been financed in large part by massive quantities of debt. This
debt represents an enormous effective subsidy, much, much larger than the
formal subsidies provided the fossil fuel industry, especially those debts,
(and they represent a substantial fraction,) which will never be repaid. Considerations of the relative discount rates
of oil and money, also suggest the actual effective subsidy is much greater. (The discount rate of a non-renewable resource
should probably be considered at most zero, and more likely negative, since all
current consumption necessarily implies less ultimately available in the future,
likely coupled with an increase in demand.) And as above, these debts represent demand
transferred from the larger real economy to support the production of energy.
Infrastructure neglect is also an effective subsidy.
My guesstimate of a price that reflects the real cost,
everything I can think of considered, of oil is somewhere well over $100 per
barrel. The difference between that and
what we actually pay we are passing to the future, our own and that of our
descendants. It is a price we will begin
to pay when the delusion live under (and which requires an input of real resources
to maindain,) can no longer be sustained.
So, sometime around or, actually before1980, the leaders of
society decided to pursue their own narrow and what may ultimately prove to be
ephemeral gains, rather than look after the enduring interests of their society.
The actual process of their choosing the consolidation of power has been noted
elsewhere. (Consider also eg the Exxon
climate data suppression scandal.) They
propounded an ethos to justify their actions, and geared up their media to
convince society of the rightness of those actions. And the people, for their part, got to live
beyond their means, splurging on underpriced energy, their political acquiescence purchased with
their own futures, and that of their descendants. Most of them.
So now society is in a hole, 30 years and many trillions of dollars of
squandered resources and mal-investment, with an economy ill-adapted for a
future of costly energy.
Now some might argue that the economy has not been going down hill for the past 30 or so years. That we have instead made remarkable progress during that time. We will address that issue in the next post.
Saturday, October 31, 2015
A Few Brief Remarks on Walmart
A few brief remarks on Walmart
We examine some of the effects of Walmart on a local economy,
and the nation’s. There is about one store per 100,000 in the US, each with average revenues of
about $110 Million. The revenue of a
small retail establishment is about $3 Million, so a Walmart displaces about 35
small retailers, generally locally owned businesses which previously helped
provide much of the community leadership.
If we include the earnings of the owners of these businesses, the payroll of the Walmart is
less than that previously provided by the sum of the small retailers, so the
employment situation is also worsened when a Walmart moves in.
This calculation, of course, does not include the benefit of
the increased consumer surplus provided by Walmart’s always lower prices. However, if these benefits are limited to an
increase in purchases of consumer goods and services, as we would expect since
the consumer surplus is widely dispersed among Walmart customers, we would not
expect this to improve the capital situation of the community. Indeed, the
value existing capital in the community is severely reduced. Downtown
commercial rents, for instance, would be severely depressed, as the value of
the buildings themselves.
In compensation for this damage, Walmart paid taxes of $7 Billion on $22 Billion profits, or
31.8%. But: Public assistance for its
employees cost the US
government $6.2 Billion last year, so in
effect Walmart paid $800 Million taxes on $15 Billion profits, or slightly over 5%. If instead it had paid its
employees the $6.2 Billion more, so they would not need to collect public
assistance, it would still have to pay 31.8% on $15.8 Billion. To raise the
salary of their employees $1, roughly, they would have to pay out $2. The people at
Walmart Headquarters are probably smart, so presumably they have made this
calculation also, and given present government policy, optimized it. Indeed, as the reference indicates, this is
probably general behavior among retailers, and other low wage industries. An interesting problem for economists.
This calculation is for 2013:
Many of Walmart's employees did receive a raise last year, somewhere between $1 and $3 so the figures have changed a little.
But not a lot.
Fast food companies do pretty much the same thing:
So we're probably talking about a comparable manipulation of their tax bill, as well. Nominally, retailers seem to pay a lot more in taxes than they really do, if we subtract the billions and billions of dollars the government has to fork out to support the retailers' under-paid employees. So these retailers are not at all quite the good citizens they try to appear to be.
Clearly, a minimum wage where taxpayers have to supplement the worker's income for them to reach subsistence is inadequate.
Edited and corrected: 12/2/2019
Edited and corrected: 12/2/2019
Wednesday, September 30, 2015
A Third and a Fourth Reason Libertarian Societies Must Fail
A Third and Fourth Reason Libertarian Societies Must Fail
We previously presented two social problems libertarian
societies are incapable of solving. The
first is the producer-consumer problem:
Without a compulsive mechanism to continually, or at least periodically,
redistribute demand, that is, a government capable of effective taxation, the
net consumers, (which is to say, those who actually allocate consumption,) end up with all the money, and the producers
end up decapitalized. The second is the
bully problem: In the absence of a
government, there is no mechanism to prevent the strong from victimizing the
weak.
A third reason is the necessity to regulate competition
among the powerful. The problem here is
that, among the powerful, there are two incompatible expressions of self
interest.
Consider the rest of society as the common resource of the
wealthy. Clearly it is in the collective interests of the wealthy to manage,
maintain, and nurture society, since they are dependent on it. However, it is in the individual interests of
the wealthy to exploit society as much as they can, since any one who does not
will be left with less, and weaker than the others. The wealthy are thus in competition with each
other to exploit society, and to the greatest of their ability. It is the tragedy of the commons, where the
commons is the entirety of society.
Now there are (many) cases of successful community
regulation of shared resources. But they
are invariably local in scale, and associated with strong and close community
relationships.
In the absence of close community, there are only two
solutions. One is to divide up the
resources. In terms of a country, this
would be the fragmentation of that country into smaller ones, and the
assumption of the government functions of each new country by a single
individual. In this case, the libertarian society fails by fragmentation into a
collection of independent autocracies. However, the force of competition
between nations need not allow this as a solution at all, as resources may be
consumed in a greater than sustainable rate in an arms race. That is, the competition between the new, smaller,
nations to build force will impose a higher rate of discounting the
future.
The other solution is to restrain and direct the self
interested behavior of the wealthy by an overarching agency. That is, the
institution of a government of sufficient strength to restrain the wealthy. One of the necessary requirements of strength
needed to accomplish this is an effective monopoly of force by the
government. So the
third reason, then, that a libertarian society will fail, is that
either it will tear itself apart, or it will acquire a government.
And this is already incompatible with the premises of Right
Libertarianism. However, even this government is
not sufficient. The monopoly of force will merely prevent the competition
between entities from itself degenerating into a balance of realized and potential
violence. The other required ability
of the government is to force the internalization of costs. The internalization of costs must be done in
both space and time. In particular,
pollution must be eliminated, or at least paid for in real, compensatory,
investment. Also, all resources must be
consumed at a sustainable rate. Since the consumption of non-renewable
resources by definition cannot be sustained, they must be either recycled or,
if they are of a nature where they cannot be recycled, dependence on them must
be eliminated. Only with this requirement can society be assured that the
benefits of production are greater than the costs.
One note here. The greater the concentration of wealth, the greater the powers of government required to counterbalance it.
To put the point nicely: Right Libertarianism, except
perhaps on the smallest scale, lacks the necessary organization to respond to
the demands of its physical environment. This includes the demands made by other, more organized, societies. This is the fourth reason libertarian societies will fail.
Regarding organization, the body politic of Right
Libertarianism might be regarded to most closely resemble that of a jellyfish,
rather than any higher life form with some sort of functioning brain. In consideration of that, the increasing rise
of moneyed power, the concomitant reduction in government functionality as it increasingly becomes subject to control by the wealthy,
the "Libertarianization" of our nation, are given additional perspective.
Wednesday, August 19, 2015
A Response to Kanbur/Stiglitz: Economics is a Mess, and Economists Need to Fix it. Fast.
This post was basically written to be posted over at Naked Capitalism. It was written as a response to this post: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/08/kanburstiglitz-rent-seeking-as-a-major-driver-of-wealth-and-income-inequality.html
EDIT(8/20/2015): Well, Naked Capitalism chose not to publish this. Perhaps it is a bit frenetic. I did crank it out in a few hours. As may be.
One possible issue is I did not address 'rent seeking,' per se. My view on rent seeking is that it is up to the regulators of an economy to minimize and distribute it, and up to economists to provide the best theory for doing so. Since basically everyone tries to do it all the time, to address it as original cause would seem not to be a properly economic issue. However, if the problem is some institutional structure which permits some small slice of society to damage the rest of society with their rent seeking, then that institutional structure is what you want to address.
Anyway, if you disagree with this post, please comment. If you agree, feel free to comment, also. And then you might want to help spread the word. END EDIT.
One possible issue is I did not address 'rent seeking,' per se. My view on rent seeking is that it is up to the regulators of an economy to minimize and distribute it, and up to economists to provide the best theory for doing so. Since basically everyone tries to do it all the time, to address it as original cause would seem not to be a properly economic issue. However, if the problem is some institutional structure which permits some small slice of society to damage the rest of society with their rent seeking, then that institutional structure is what you want to address.
Anyway, if you disagree with this post, please comment. If you agree, feel free to comment, also. And then you might want to help spread the word. END EDIT.
A Response to Kanbur/Stiglitz: Economics is a Mess, and Economists Need to
Fix it. Fast.
Recently, Yves crossposted (from VOXEU) an analysis by
professors Ravi Kanbur and Joseph Stiglitz.
(Also posted by Mark Thoma at http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/ )This analysis raises the issue that
currently fashionable theories in economics may not be able to adequately
explain our current, unequal, economy.
While their analysis has value, and admits to serious problems in the
study of economics as it is currently understood, the post does not go nearly
far enough in acknowledging or addressing the actual problems which may be
found in the foundations of the field of economics,.
As can be shown, these problems rest with some of the
fundamental assumptions underlying the practice of economics, and until these
errors are addressed, economics will continue to only poorly represent the
reality it seeks to describe.
First, regarding the particular issues raised by Profs.
Kanbur and Stiglitz. In the concluding
remarks to their post, they propose the following changes to the analysis of
the problem of inequality. They propose
these changes as necessary to gain an adequate understanding of the problem:
“Concluding Remarks
Thus, the
new stylised facts of our era demand new theories of income distribution.
- First, we need to break away from competitive marginal productivity theories of factor returns and model mechanisms which generate rents with consequences for wealth inequality.
This will
entail a greater focus on the ‘rules of the game.’ (Stiglitz et al 2015).
- Second, we need to focus on the interaction between income from physical and financial capital and income from human capital in determining snapshot inequality, but also in determining the intergenerational transmission of inequality.
- Third, we need to further develop normative theories of equity which can address mechanisms of inequality transmission from generation to generation.”
To be fair, the first item is actually a pretty deep
cut. ‘Marginal productivity theories’
are fundamental, some of their basics taught to budding freshmen in Econ101. For
any economist to call these into question is an act, first of all, of
intellectual courage.
However, I think the problem with this formulation runs at
once deeper, but is also more shallow, than the real issue. On the shallow side, models are what
economists construct to gain an understanding of a very complex reality. If in some way, the behavior of the model
mirrors the behavior of reality, the model is usually considered a
success. Models can be simple, and based
on a few simple assumptions, or like the Kaldor-Kuznets model Profs. Kandur and
Stiglitz discuss, more complicated, and based not on just simple assumptions,
but some previous body of theory developed from and based on those
assumptions. So questioning such a
sophisticated model is only an incidental attack on its underlying
assumptions. And replacing such a model,
then, with one based on equally sophisticated theory, does not necessarily
address the underlying problem with the assumptions. And here, Kandur and Stiglitz seem to be proposing we essentially start with
model mechanisms which must ‘generate rents.’ This seems to beg the question, and so such a
model will likely be basically useless.
And on the deep side, are the assumptions underlying
‘marginal productivity theories’ the correct ones to attack? I am not so proficient at economics that I
can determine whether the assumptions underlying ‘marginal productivity theories’
are above reproach. In my understanding
of the theories, however, they seem pretty useful, and generally so.
So I can instead offer alternative assumptions, different
from the assumptions I believe economists make, calling them into question. I believe
the economics profession should, in any case, examine them.
Now. for item two, however, I think Prof. Stiglitz makes a
wrong cut. He lumps physical and
financial capital together, when they are not at all the same thing, and the
difference is especially glaring for this problem. In particular, financial capital feeds off physical capital. Prof Stiglitz then lumps all human capital
together, when the relevant distinction is between labor, in particular labor
closely tied to physical production, and management, in particular those who
manage financial capital. Thus the
appropriate associations are between physical capital and labor, and between
financial capital and (upper) management: The one exploits the other, and
indeed, that is how we can define them.
So he puts the lions and the lambs
in the same pen. Twice.
But, let me add that the assertion financial capital and upper
management exploit labor and physical capital may be unfair. The necessary counter claim would be that the
benefits to labor and physical capital of the activities of management and
financial capital outweigh the costs to labor and physical capital of those
activities. This claim may, in fact, be
true. The claim would seem, however, to
be contradicted by the evidence of the combination of increasing inequality,
and the decline in the investment in and even maintenance of, society’s real
capital. These processes do suggest that ‘exploit’ is indeed the proper word.
In item number three, I believe Prof Stiglitz implies that
current normative theories of equity are basically correct, but “further”
theories need to be developed, and presumably developed from those basically ‘correct’
theories.
One of the fundamental and essential assumptions underlying
current theories of equity, however, is the standard, textbook definition of
money. If this definition of money is in error, then so is our understanding of
equity. So is our understanding of
asset. So is our understanding of the nature of investment. And so would our understanding of the flows
and distributions of assets and their distributions. We could not claim to
understand either the state of an economy, nor its dynamics. In all these things we would be no more than
part right, and certainly also quite mistaken. So.
Conventional economics must examine some of its fundamental
assumptions. Here are three corrected assumptions
for economists to look at. They need not agree with my assumptions. But, as Yves said to my earlier post, they
need at least to refute them. As a
fourth item, I also bring to attention statistical mechanics. This is a field whose potential contributions
I believe economists fail to appreciate.
1)
The textbook definition of money, which I assume is
still relevant to the study of
economics, is wrong: Money is only incidentally
a measure or a store of value. It is actually
a measure and store of *demand* on (things of real) value. Because money is merely demand, it cannot
reliably distinguish between productive assets, and ‘assets’ which are in fact a
drain on production and maintenance of real wealth in an economy. Money, for instance, cannot distinguish
between the value of a high school, and the value of a yacht. In fact, money, especially if badly
distributed in an economy, favors the production of yachts over high schools,
and in general, the consumption of resources over their production. I argue
this point in greater detail at: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/06/the-standard-definition-of-money-is-in-error.html
2)
While the costs of factors of production are additive,
the combination of factors in production is multiplicative. Labor and capital multiply to create
production. Consider, for starters, how
much is *added* to the value of the freight of an empty truck going across
country. And in general, where the cost
of an activity exceeds its benefit, it is because the multiplicative factor of
that activity is less than one. For example, in the analysis of sectors,
finance is multiplicative, as is government.
For another example, academia, and in particular the study of economics
itself, is multiplicative. To say that economists add to the value of things produced in an economy is absurd. Economists
produce nothing of substance: Nothing that anybody can eat; Nothing that will heat anybody’s home. What they do produce, or are supposed to
produce, is understanding. This understanding offered by economists can
multiply the productive capacity of an economy. Policy adapted from correct
theory can increase the productive efficiency and resiliency of an economy. Efficiency is a multiplicative factor. This
factor can be greater than one for sound policy. Or that productive efficiency can be reduced,
the multiplier become less than one, when policy is based on unsound theory.
3)
The motives of capitalists are not the same as the
motives of society as a whole.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that the activities of capitalists
advance the interests of society.
Indeed, where their motives conflict, where, for example, there is
opportunity for capitalists to externalize the costs of their activities, there
is every reason to suppose otherwise.
4)
The study of statistical mechanics is a well developed
branch of physics, and one that a few physicists, at least, have been trying to
apply to economics. For statistical
mechanics to have application to large systems of ‘particles,’ all that is
required is some form of interaction
between the particles. One implication of the approach is that there are what
might be called ‘natural’ distributions of wealth an income. Resources must be consumed to maintain
distributions of wealth and income which are different from these ‘natural’
distributions. And indeed, the greater
the deviations of these ‘unnatural’ distributions from the natural ones, the
more resources which must be consumed merely to maintain them. There
are problems with dimensionality to be worked out, and I have not been following
the literature. However, I can say that I have not heard much about
this approach from economists. I do not
access the formal literature all that much, but from the economics blogs I
frequent, I have heard nothing. http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0211175v1.pdf
“Statistical Mechanics of Money, Income,
and Wealth: A Short Survey,” from 2002
might be a start for the interested economist.
Kanbur and Stiglitz are deserving of great respect, They
have labored long and hard and produced important results in the difficult and,
what also should be, the immensely valuable field of economics. But, if the assumptions those results are
based on are in error, then much of the effort that they and their colleagues
have expended have been wasted. And the same can be said of any future
investment they, and our society, make, if any errors are not corrected.
Worse, much of those efforts may even have been counterproductive, and
this may continue.
To many outside observers, the study of economics seems
incoherent. Is it? In many cases, diametrically opposed descriptions and
prescriptions can each find support from one or another school of economics. If
the study of economics is incoherent, this raises the questions: Is the study
of economics incoherent because it is politicized? Or is it politicized because
it is incoherent? If economics is
incoherent because it is politicized, then it cannot qualify as a science: It
is not the study of, or the theory of, any objective phenomenon. It is, and can
be, no more than one or another’s propaganda.
If instead economics is merely incoherent in the
understanding of economists, economics as a science need not be incoherent in
principle. For coherent theory to be developed, consistent assumptions need first
be discovered. This failure of
understanding then, a failure which is exploited by politicians, is because the
assumptions actually used by economists to make and base their theories on cannot
be consistent. From inconsistent assumptions, mutually contradictory
conclusions can be drawn. If
contradictory conclusions can be drawn, we should not be surprised that the
various players should choose from economics those conclusions which favor
their own interests, and those economists, who espouse those conclusions.
Neither should we be surprised if those players also deny the conclusions which
stand in opposition to those interests. After all, they have refutations, and
people to argue them. And so we should also
not be surprised if many of the pronouncements of economists are ignored.
Incoherency also implies that any conclusions economics
reaches will fail, at least in part, to correspond to reality, where economics is
so understood. This does not necessarily
mean here that economics will totally fail to represent reality. Indeed, microeconomics provides much
excellent application. But the true definition of money is not important in
microeconomics. In macroeconomics, however,
the definition of money may be very important.
I claim that money, and its flows, impose many significant forces on an
economy in the large, with the consequence of many stresses and distortions in
that economy. In this I do not think I
am alone. So if the definition of money is in error, then so long as it is in
error, explanations for these distortions, if even they are noticed and
recognized, will remain mysterious. The
best theories will be no more than ad hoc rationalizations. Like the Ptolemaic Cosmology, these theories
will be bereft of any true insight.
It is the implicit opinion of some policy makers on the
Right that society has no genuine need for economists, or their dubious ‘economics.’ Their claim is that the free markets of
unfettered capitalists create the optimum economy, and the optimum society. To them, the only use for economists is to
enable such capitalists to more efficiently exploit these markets, and so
enhance their profits. Nowhere for them is there any other role for economists.
There is no point to economic analysis, because there is no point to economic
governance. To them, there can be no better economy. There can be no better society.
One final word:
Today’s academic money-centric economics is to very large
degree woefully unequipped to handle the analysis of the demands of an increasing
population on a diminishing resource base. Most seem to be in denial, their
activities increasingly irrelevant to our collective future. What ever else he,
or she, may think of this post, every economist, every reader, needs to look
at: http://www.overshootday.org/ and the links it points to.
Their analysis concludes that humanity is using the earth’s
resources at a rate it takes 1.6 earths to replenish. The other way they put it,
for the year up to August 13, humanity consumed the amount of resources it
would take the earth one entire year to replace. Simply, we are consuming our
children’s future today, and at an ever accelerating rate.
There is a need for a correct understanding of economics. There
is a need for economists to clean their house.
It is the case that while we may never run out of money, we
may run out of the things that money will buy. However, if the standard definition of money
is correct, we may indeed be fortunate. According to the standard definition of
money, $10 of money has the same value as $10 of food. So if we run out of food, we may yet be able
to eat the money.
Sunday, August 16, 2015
A Second Reason Libertarian Societies must Fail
In the previous post, we argued that a mechanism for the redistribution of demand was required to maintain a society. In a libertarian society, there can be no such mechanism. In consequence, in a libertarian society the market for production is progressively destroyed, and with the market the entire economy.
There is also a more direct reason libertarian societies fail: Libertarian societies provide no adequate mechanism for protecting your neighbor from the aggression of others. There must be a mechanism, because without such a mechanism, there is inadequate motive for you, or anyone else, to help your neighbor resist the bully.
It is in the concentrated interest of the bully to oppress your neighbor. The bully may profit greatly if he succeeds. The benefits to the bully will be greater than the cost. But you, and everyone else, only have a diffuse interest in helping your neighbor resist the bully. The cost to you to help your neighbor is concentrated, and may be far greater than the benefit to you. Further, if mutual aid is agreed to, but such protection is voluntary, it is in your interest, and the interest of others who might be expected to contribute, to contribute as little as possible to the protection of your neighbor. Which would likely be nothing. This is an instance of the free rider problem: If anyone can ride for free, everyone will ride for free, because only a fool, (or a saint, perhaps,) would pay for what is offered for free.
So the consequence is that in the absence of government, and police, and regulation, the bully, the large organization, the wealthy, will dominate and oppress your neighbor, and after your neighbor, you. A government diffuses the cost for the protection of your neighbor across the whole society. In the libertarian state, some are more equal than others, and the more equal shall devour the liberties of the less equal, because the only thing to stop them is: principle. That is, in libertarianism, the only mechanism to stop the powerful from effectively enslaving the weak is the moral disposition of those same powerful interests.
From the point of view of Widerquist's thesis, there is only the pronouncement of platitudes and the benevolence of the powerful to prevent the establishment of absolute monarchy by force of violence. There is no real reason for the prospective despot to wait on 'legitimate' means.
There is also a more direct reason libertarian societies fail: Libertarian societies provide no adequate mechanism for protecting your neighbor from the aggression of others. There must be a mechanism, because without such a mechanism, there is inadequate motive for you, or anyone else, to help your neighbor resist the bully.
It is in the concentrated interest of the bully to oppress your neighbor. The bully may profit greatly if he succeeds. The benefits to the bully will be greater than the cost. But you, and everyone else, only have a diffuse interest in helping your neighbor resist the bully. The cost to you to help your neighbor is concentrated, and may be far greater than the benefit to you. Further, if mutual aid is agreed to, but such protection is voluntary, it is in your interest, and the interest of others who might be expected to contribute, to contribute as little as possible to the protection of your neighbor. Which would likely be nothing. This is an instance of the free rider problem: If anyone can ride for free, everyone will ride for free, because only a fool, (or a saint, perhaps,) would pay for what is offered for free.
So the consequence is that in the absence of government, and police, and regulation, the bully, the large organization, the wealthy, will dominate and oppress your neighbor, and after your neighbor, you. A government diffuses the cost for the protection of your neighbor across the whole society. In the libertarian state, some are more equal than others, and the more equal shall devour the liberties of the less equal, because the only thing to stop them is: principle. That is, in libertarianism, the only mechanism to stop the powerful from effectively enslaving the weak is the moral disposition of those same powerful interests.
From the point of view of Widerquist's thesis, there is only the pronouncement of platitudes and the benevolence of the powerful to prevent the establishment of absolute monarchy by force of violence. There is no real reason for the prospective despot to wait on 'legitimate' means.
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