Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts

Saturday, June 27, 2015

Greece and Germany have Essentially only Four Things to Talk About.



Greece and Germany have essentially only four things to talk about.  And these are not the things they have been talking about.

1:  How big a piece of Greece do the Germans want?
2:  What percentage of the Greek GDP do the Germans want?
3:  How long do they want it for?

And since because the trade deficit, mostly with Germany, and austerity have damaged the Greek economy, perhaps beyond its ability to repair itself: 

4:  How much will Germany capitalize Greece to restore its industry so that it can pay Germany back?.

What the Greeks have to talk about among themselves is by how much, and for how long, they want to remain burdened by a corrupt aristocracy that essentially sold out the rest of the country to the Germans.

If these issues are not addressed, the Greeks will have to escape outside of the box they have apparently been thinking in, if they are to come to terms with the reality of their situation.



EDIT (4/4/2015) Apparently, many Greeks consider themselves part of their aristocracy.  A disproportionate number think themselves above paying taxes, and another disproportionate number think themselves deserving of government employment or support.  Do the Greeks think the benefits of civilization are not worth paying for? Consider this post:  https://medium.com/nav-blog/the-story-of-the-greek-debt-crisis-in-20-charts-7e39ef9d6c2e

 However, all this bad behavior seems to be enabled by the country running a trade deficit.  Only by running a trade deficit can the people of a country consume more than they produce.  With a country maintains balanced trade, one person’s profligacy can only be maintained at the expense of other citizens.  This provides a people with an important motive to discourage indolence in their fellows.  

Of course, as we have discussed elsewhere on this blog, running a trade deficit does more than encourage profligate behavior among the citizenry.  http://anamecon.blogspot.com/2015/01/destruction-of-production-from.html
It progressively destroys productive capacity, making it ever more difficult to maintain living standards by domestic industry alone.  Further, the benefits of running a trade deficit are illusory.  Purchasing power declines more than the decline of prices of those imports which replace domestic production.     

The Germans are not innocents in this travesty.  They pursued policies destructive of their trading partner’s economies, so they themselves could profit and grow.  See Dr. Heiner Flassbeck discuss Germany’s beggar thy neighbor policies of the past 15 years or so. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFKzAAd_1W8&feature=player_embedded

Greece, being small, is just the first domino to fall.
 

Sunday, December 18, 2011

European Debt Crisis: Talk by Dr. Heiner Flassbeck

OK. TV Time again. Take 20 minutes to understand the cause of the European debt crisis. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFKzAAd_1W8&feature=player_embedded

Back in the 1990’s , just before the initiation of the euro, the Germans tried to institute a full employment policy by holding down wages for an extended period of time. That failed. They did succeed in beggaring their neighbors, however.

Or you can get it, where I first got it, at: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/12/class-war-low-wages-and-beggar-thy-neighbor.html

Where I was pointed by: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2011/12/15/never-bailed-out-europes-ants-and-grasshoppers-revisited/ (Although I visit nakedcapitalism.com regularly.)

Dr. Flassbeck concludes with a few words about the US, worth noting also.

Still like the idea of Import Certificates, since they force the balance of trade, and each country's policy is independent of any other country's policy, even if with a currency union.
http://anamecon.blogspot.com/2011/10/import-certificates-problem-and.html

Saturday, October 1, 2011

Trade Certificates: Solution to the European Debt Crisis

Trade Certificates: Solution to European Debt Crisis


Here’s a nice discussion of the European debt crisis:

http://streetlightblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/estimating-cost-of-eurozone-crisis.html

It’s the third of three articles on the thing, so click on the blog title to access the rest.

We reduce it to the producer-consumer problem. See:http://anamecon.blogspot.com/2010/05/greek-debt-and-producer-consumer.html

But Kash describes the crisis per se is a result of the sudden cessation of capital flows from the center of the Eurozone to the periphery. These flows had to cease, and probably suddenly, some time, as the debt imbalance inevitably piled up. Kash also notes a fair percentage of those flows were for investment. The periphery countries weren’t exactly squandering the money, but that really doesn't matter, except to make the tragedy more poignant. He suggests shared responsibility for the crisis. Yes, the central countries have to pay. Actually, have already paid, they just have to swallow their losses. Making the peripherals pay is just going to make them less able to consume German surplus production. In fact, the peripherals have to achieve a trade surplus. Germany will have to find other markets for its surplus. Inflicting pain on the periphery, except to the point where they have to live within their means, is graceless. Of course, the entire process of- inflicting surplus production on them has reduced their ability to do this. The same thing has happened to the US with its trade deficit. Its ability to live within its means, actually the means itself, its industry, has been compromised.

Now Greece borrowed a lot of foreign money. That money had to be, eventually, spent on foreign goods. Or else they would still have it, in cash, and be able to give it back. We observe that debt, if you don't have the cash, must be ultimately be payed with goods, services, or assets. Nothing else will do.

So what is to be done? Austerity works for households. For nations? You might think. But the problem is deflating a nation's economy destroys productive components while it is reducing consuming elements. Indeed, the productive elements need the consuming elements to continue consuming unless they have compensating export opportunities. For it is only by exporting that the deficit country can pay back the debt, but will the surplus countries allow this to happen? Or instead is the deficit country is forced to sell assets, which worsens its ability to pay in the future?

In fact, the entire process, in the absence of any debt forgiveness, has a dubious- morality. The surplus country lowers prices, drives businesses in the deficit country out of business. See:

http://anamecon.blogspot.com/2010/04/effects-of-unbalanced-trade.html

Runs up the debt in the deficit country, then buys up the deficit country's assets. Moral? Or a form of war?

Greece, for instance, had a significantly deteriorating trade balance since about 1990. It seems to be a self-reinforcing thing. And now its assets are being sold. Germany's trade surplus has been increasing steadily since 1990. Is it buying Greek assets?

We recommend the introduction of import certificates, to force a balance of trade, and pay off reasonable debt. See: http://seekingalpha.com/article/203422-how-import-certificates-could-balance-trade-and-budget

Or for a brief description on import certificates, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Import_Certificates

Rather than the targeted certificates, we merely encourage all deficit countries to phase in general certificates, not aimed at any country. Indeed, once the process starts, certificate trading will quickly become the norm, since deficits will be forced and focused on those deficit countries which do not practice it, and trade wars will ensue between surplus countries.

Better than selling the farm. Certificates could be phased in, to prevent economic trauma. The goal would be exporters would be issued 1 euro worth of import certificates for each euro they exported. This certificate would allow the importation of 1 euro worth of goods or services. These certificates could be bought and sold. For the deficit country, these could be phased in, starting near the percentage of deficit. Thus, for a country with a 30% trade deficit, they could be originally issued at 1.25 euro worth of imports allowed, say, for each euro worth of export, and then reduced in periodic increments until one euro of import per euro worth of export, at which point trade would be balanced. In fact, if this were practiced by Greece, eventually their trade and capital flows would each be balanced. Problem solved. To pay back what is already owed, eventually Greece must have a trade surplus, so it would, for a while be issuing certificates allowing say .9 euros of imports for every euro worth of exports. This would force it to have a 10% trade surplus, with which to pay back its debts. It also implies that they willl be consuming at less than their production, which is the point of the austerity process. Of course, the process would take longer than any interest on the loans Greece presently owes to compound to unpayable heights. Do the Germans have any intention of allowing Greece to pay them back, since this would damage their own economy? Or are they instead after Greek assets?

But Greece can be the master of its own fate, if it so chooses. With a little help. And so can the US.

And the peoples of the Germanys and Chinas of the world will have to consume to their ability to produce.

Meanwhile, with each country issuing trading certificates, international trade wold be balanced on a nation by nation basis. No country could be claimed to exploit its surplus to cripple the economy of another, and expand its own economy at the other country's expense. All countries would have to live with in their means. And the benefits of otherwise free trade could be enjoyed at a maximum sustainable amount.

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Zero Interest and the Greek Problem

One way of looking at the problem of zero interest rate is that lenders have a lot of money to lend, but no one to lend it to, as borrowers have a lot of debt, on which they are already paying a high interest. Big supply, low demand. This is the expected end state of the lend-borrow cycle. It is a stable state, which can only be changed by sufficient disturbance. Even the massive borrowing of the government is not enough to disturb it, so the amount of money lenders are holding must be even larger. The only way to get off this state is to eliminate the debt, so the lenders can go back to lending the money to the borrowers. Note, this does not require the lenders to give up their actual money, just their claims on the borrowers.

If we suppose the borrower has nothing, then the only actual loss to the lender is the claim on the future income stream of the borrower.

If we look at Greece under austerity, its income stream will be negative for the foreseeable future. Thus, the Germans, unless they propose to buy up Greece, will do themselves a favor by forgiving the Greek debt. Lending more will only result in larger default down the road. So they will also do themselves a favor by refusing to lend the Greeks any more money, but here the problem is the producer-consumer problem: The Greeks are a net consumer of German production, and thus stimulate the German economy (at the expense of their own. See: http://anamecon.blogspot.com/2010/04/effects-of-unbalanced-trade.html ) Without the borrowed money, the Greeks won't be able to continue consuming German production.

However, because of fractional reserve banking, Greek debt is collateral for other money. People borrowed to lend. And others borrowed to lend. That is, Greek debt is money, to its holders, and acts like money. If it disappears, those who borrowed to lend to Greece will have no collateral. The bottom line is forgiving the debt would result in a contraction of the money supply. Because the loans are highly leveraged, that is capital requirements are low, the contraction is likely to be disproportionate to the actual default. This would put additional deflationary pressures on other countries of the Euro periphery, and would also make it more difficult for these countries to pay their debts.

Refusing to lend the Greeks any more money will force the Greeks to pay their taxes, which they seem to be unwilling to do, and/or contract their public sector.

Of course, this does not address the other basic problem, which is there is too much money at the top of the economic pyramid. Since this leads to a contraction of demand in the rest of the economy for real production, there are no profitable real investments for this money to make. The financial sectors of the various nations are simply too big to be supported by the real economies. For US, see: http://anamecon.blogspot.com/2010/06/that-bloated-financial-sector.html )

Thus a large contraction of money at the top might be economically therapeutic. (And with less money to lend, interest rates might well go up, though this itself might stimulate inflation. Hmm...) However, the government should just guarantee the money of the depositors, (ie taxpayers and consumers,) rather than the banks, which need a shaking out anyway. Indeed, guaranteeing the banks just aggravates the problem.

Friday, May 21, 2010

The Greek Problem Again

Well, it's 12 days since my post on the Greek Debt. Euro 440B from the eurozone, euro 60B from the European Commission, and euro 250B from the International Monetary Fund. Never let it be said the IMF doesn't take care of its own. Plus the US and other countries are going to guarantee dollars. Couldn't find out how much.

So that's a lot of money. But it is all loans, and the fans are not impressed. A The markets seem to think that this is just pushing the problem down the road. And it is. Germany doesn't want to bite the bullet and let Greece, and the other countries it has a current accounts surplus with, off the hook. But it will let the bankers and other speculators off, and put the European taxpayers on instead. We are talking about a massive transfer of wealth here. And the problem: Still the producer-consumer problem. The only way out is to give the Greeks, and the other PIIGS for that matter, back their money, so they can spend it on German goods again, and keep those factories in the Ruhr humming. So, with the people of the European Union somewhat poorer from the experience, they can all go back to work. Will they be wiser?

Meanwhile, a trillion dollar contribution to sovereign debt. The wise banker should be shaking in his shoes, because bankers the world over are going to succeed beyond their wildest dreams. If things play out.. wrong, and this is a giant step in that direction, they're going to end up with all the money! What a happy day that will be for them!

All our banker has to do is give it away. But, like the monkey with his hand in the jar, he won't let go of the banana. And if the monkey won't let go of the banana, he can't get his hand out of the jar. So he's stuck there.

Clues you in to how smart our masters are. Unfortunately running a monetary system requires a little more intellect, and a lot more balls, and pandering to the powers isn't going to do it.

Sunday, May 9, 2010

Greek Debt and the Producer-Consumer Problem

Well, I just looked it up and the Greek debt stands at euro 298 billion. Mostly goods. Mostly EU. (It joined the EU in 2001.) The EU is going to bail out Greece to the tune of euro 110 billion. Last I heard. As a loan. Basically this is really bailing out the people who loaned Greece money.

This will not solve the problem.

I figure the best thing for the EU to do is just give the money to the Greeks, and then they can go back to playing the same game. Give the Greeks back their money, so they can go back to spending it on imports from Germany, and the Germans can go back to making exports for Greece. Otherwise the interest on the loan is just going to come due, Greece won't be able to pay up, it will stop importing and put a little crimp in the German economy. And then the other little PIIGS come to market.

Another way to put this is just have Greece default on its debts.

The only other option is for Germany to buy up Greece. Which still won't solve the long range problem, which is maintaining Greece as a market for German goods.

Which is the general producer-consumer problem. No matter how much money the consumer starts with, eventually the producer ends up with all the money. Then the producer either has to give the money back to the consumer, stop producing, 'loan' the consumer the money, or buy the the consumer's assets. Buying the consumer's assets is just another step in the process, and doesn't work in the long run because eventually the producer will still end up with all the money. And the assets. And this chokes off demand. Loaning the money to the consumers doesn't solve the problem, because the loan compounds, and eventually the costs of servicing it chokes off demand. Only by giving back the money is demand maintained.

The only way for the game to continue is for the producer to work out a way to give the money back to the consumer. Otherwise the game comes to a stop. Chaos ensues. Anarchy. The death of millions, etc.

This is the general instability of the market system. This is important. Pay attention. This is the general instability of the market system. Especially under free trade, (ie a 'free' market.) And not just between countries, but between any organized entities, or any individuals. If any individual works just the slightest bit more than another, and there is free trade (exchange) between them, either the harder working individual trades down, that is accepts less that par value for what the other has to offer, and allows the other to trade up, or he eventually ends up with all the other's assets. The other ends up with no assets, and the harder worker ends up with it all.

And as between two, so between three or four or a million. The hardest worker(s) eventually end up with it all. And this might be called the most just result. Of course, it doesn't have to be the hardest worker. It could be the cleverest, or the luckiest. Or the one with the most leverage.

Because the producers don't necessarily end up with all the money. There is another class, whom we will call manipulators. The manipulators do not produce anything, but they control the money, and because they control the money, they can arrange it so that they themselves are the most efficient accumulators of money. More so even than the producers. So they are the ones who end up with all the money. And the assets.

And default will be prevented, the debts assumed by the people, so as not to offend the sensibilities of the manipulators.

Many libertarians go on about: "What ever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just." (Nozick) Well, the end result of this 'justice' is the impoverishment of most of society, and ownership of everything in the hands of a very few. (Actually one, in the limit.) And not even those most 'deserving,' not even those who most contribute to the wealth of society, but the most skilled at manipulating. Horrorshow.

The generalization is mine, I think. The particular with reference to free trade, is: "Mathematical modeling reveals that under these conditions, outright Las Vegas decadence is not necessary for there to be a problem. It reveals that with free trade between nations with merely different discounts on consumption, the nation with the higher discount (more impatient) will tend to maximize present consumption by having past generations (who produced the assets that can be sold off) or future generations (who will service the debt) pay for present consumption. Various factors can interfere, but that's the underlying dynamic." Ian Fletcher, 'Free Trade Doesn't Work What Should Replace it and Why.' (p47) He includes this reference to Joseph Stiglitz: 'Factor Price Equalization in a Dynamic Economy,' Journal of Political Economy May/June 1970.